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Abstract:	We	present	a	new	understanding	of	Christ’s	real	presence	in	
the	Eucharist	on	the	model	of	Stump’s	account	of	God’s	omnipresence	
and	Green	and	Quan’s	account	of	experiencing	God	in	Scripture.	On	this	
understanding,	 Christ	 is	 derivatively,	 rather	 than	 fundamentally,	
located	in	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine,	such	that	Christ	is	present	
to	 the	 believer	 through	 the	 consecrated	 bread	 and	 wine,	 thereby	
making	available	to	the	believer	a	second-person	experience	of	Christ,	
where	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine	are	the	way	in	which	she	shares	
attention	 with	 him.	 The	 consecrated	 bread	 and	 wine	 are	 then,	 in	 a	
sense,	icons	of	Christ.	
	
	
He	wondered	where	she	had	hidden	herself,	.	.	.	[t]he	woman	who	knelt	
down	on	the	floor	in	front	of	him,	and	took	him	by	the	shoulders	on	the	
morning	of	his	First	Holy	Communion,	and	said,	‘Remember	who	you	
are.	When	you	take	the	host,	say	it	in	your	heart:	Hello	Jesus,	my	name	
is	Emmet	Madigan.’	
Anne	Enright,	The	Green	Road	
	
‘And	 remember,	 I	 am	with	 you	 always,	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 age’	 (Matthew	28.20;	 all	
biblical	references	are	to	the	NRSV).	So	ends	the	Gospel	according	to	Matthew,	with	
Christ’s	last	words	to	his	disciples.	Now,	many	present	Christians,	latter	day	disciples,	
as	it	were,	take	these	last	words	of	Christ	to	apply	not	only	to	the	disciples	of	the	early	
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first	century	but	also	to	them.	But,	given	that	we,	and	indeed	the	disciples	of	the	early	
first	century,	following	Christ’s	ascension,	do	not	see	Christ	as	the	disciples	saw	him	
in	his	earthly	life,	as	a	physical	person	whom	we	can	see,	hear,	and	touch,	how	is	it	
possible	for	Christ	to	be	with	them	and	us	always?	No	question	could	be	more	urgent	
for	those	who,	like	the	disciples	of	the	early	first	century,	wish	to	live	in	relationship	
with	him,	though	they	have	never	seen,	heard,	or	touched	him	as	a	physical	person.		
	 One	way	to	give	a	philosophical	explanation	of	Christ’s	presence	with	us	now,	
even	though	we	do	no	not	see	him	as	the	disciples	then	saw	him,	is	to	point	to	Christ’s	
‘real	 presence’	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 and	 then	 try	 to	 explain	 just	 what	 ‘real	 presence’	
amounts	to.	The	Eucharist	is	a	sacrament	of	the	Church	that	signifies	not	only	grace	
in	those	who	participate	in	it	but	also	the	‘real	presence’	of	Christ	in	the	sacrament	
itself.	In	this	sacrament,	the	Church	re-enacts	Christ’s	last	supper	with	his	disciples:	
in	the	liturgy	of	the	sacrament,	a	priest	takes	bread	and	repeats	Christ’s	words,	‘This	
is	my	body	which	is	given	for	you.	Do	this	in	remembrance	of	me’,	and	then	takes	a	
cup	of	wine	and,	again,	repeats	Christ’s	words,	‘This	is	the	cup	of	the	new	covenant	in	
my	blood.	Do	this,	as	often	as	you	drink	it,	in	remembrance	of	me’,	and,	after	invoking	
the	Holy	Spirit,	Christ	is	now	‘really	present’	in	the	Eucharist	in	virtue	of	standing	in	
some	sort	of	relation	to	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine.	
	 Just	what	this	relation	is	has	puzzled	philosophical	theologians	for	centuries,	
with	 answers	 tending	 to	 fall	 into	 two	 groupings:	 either	 identity,	 where	 the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine	is,	in	some	way,	Christ	himself,	or	symbolic,	where	the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine,	in	some	way,	symbolize	Christ.	In	this	paper,	we	present	
a	 new	way	 of	 understanding	 this	 relation,	 namely,	 iconic,	 where	 the	 consecrated	
bread	 and	wine	 serve	 as	 icons	 of	 Christ.1	 On	 this	 understanding,	 the	 consecrated	
bread	and	wine	are	ways	of,	and	occasions	for,	a	second-person	experience	of	Christ,	
whereby	the	communicant	shares	attention	with	Christ.	We	motivate	this	account	by	
considering	 some	 recent	 advances	 in	 the	 debate	 on	 God’s	 omnipresence,	 itself	 a	
puzzling	doctrine,	using	the	lessons	learned	to	chart	the	way	forward	in	the	debate	
on	Christ’s	real	presence	in	the	Eucharist.	
	
	
1.	 God’s	 omnipresence	 and	 Christ’s	 ‘real	 presence’	 in	 the	
Eucharist	
	
With	 respect	 to	 every	 place,	 God	 is	 present	 there,	 or	 so	 says	 the	 doctrine	 of	
omnipresence.	And	if	presence	implies	location,	as	it	seems	to	do,	then,	with	respect	
                                                
1	Although	this	is	a	new	position,	there	are	similarities	with	our	account	and	a	Lutheran	
understanding	of	Christ’s	true	presence	in	the	Eucharist.	According	to	Luther,	Christ	is	present	in	the	
elements	since,	by	his	divine	nature,	he	is	present	at	all	places.	However,	he	is	present	in	a	particular	
way	in	Eucharist,	since	he	is	present	to	the	individual.	This	Lutheran	model	is	also	adopted	by	Søren	
Kierkegaard	(2011).	Although	we	too	emphasise	Christ’s	presence	to	the	participant,	we	circumvent	
the	issues	which	Luther	raises	concerning	Christ’s	ubiquity,	since	commitment	to	this	doctrine	isn’t	
necessary	for	the	position	we	develop.		
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to	every	place,	God	is	located	there.	Now,	according	to	Ross	Inman,	there	are	two	ways	
for	an	object	x	to	be	located	at	a	place	p:	
	
Fundamental	Location:	x	is	located	at	p	fundamentally	=df	x	is	located	at	
p	in	its	own	right,	i.e.	not	in	virtue	of	standing	in	a	relation(s),	to	some	
distinct	y	that	is	located	at	p	in	its	own	right.	
	
Derivative	Location:	x	is	located	at	p	derivatively	=df	x	is	located	at	p	in	
virtue	of	standing	in	some	relation(s),	to	some	distinct	entity,	y,	where	
y	is	located	at	p	fundamentally.	(Inman	forthcoming,	3)	
	
Both	 approaches	 have	 their	 recent	 champions.	 Hud	 Hudson	 (2009,	 2014),	 Inman	
(forthcoming),	 Robert	 Oakes,	 (2006)	 and	 Alexander	 Pruss	 (2013)	 defend	
fundamental	location	accounts	of	God’s	omnipresence,	while	William	Lane	Craig	and	
J.P.	 Moreland	 (2003),	 Joshua	 Hoffman	 and	 Gary	 S.	 Rosenkranz	 (2002),	 Eleonore	
Stump	 (2010,	 2013),	 Richard	 Swinburne	 (1993),	 Charles	 Taliaferro	 (1994),	 and	
Edward	Wierenga	(2010)	defend	derivative	location	accounts	of	God’s	omnipresence.		
	 We	 can	 understand	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 real	 presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	
Eucharist	in	similar	terms.	One	way	for	Christ	to	be	really	present	in	the	Eucharist	is	
for	him	 to	be	present	 in	 the	 consecrated	bread	and	wine,	 and	 so	be	 located	 in	 the	
consecrated	 bread	 and	 wine,	 and	 so	 be	 located	 at	 the	 place	 occupied	 by	 the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine.	This	would	then	be	a	fundamental	location	account	of	
the	real	presence	of	Christ	in	the	Eucharist.	The	most	prominent	such	account	is	the	
doctrine	of	transubstantiation,	according	to	which,	at	the	consecration,	the	substance	
of	the	bread	and	of	the	wine	are	transformed	into	the	substance	of	the	Body	and	Blood	
of	Christ,	respectively.	Alternatively,	Christ	could	be	really	present	in	the	Eucharist	in	
virtue	of	some	relation	he	has	with	the	fundamentally	located	consecrated	bread	and	
wine.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 transubstantiation,	 such	 derivative	 location	
accounts	of	Christ’s	real	presence	in	the	Eucharist	have	received	scant	attention	in	
the	recent	philosophical	literature	on	the	Eucharist.	We	aim	to	redress	the	balance	
and	propose	a	receptionist	account	of	Christ’s	real	presence	in	the	Eucharist	on	which	
Christ	is	really	present	to	a	believer	who	receives	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine;	
the	Eucharist	is	then	a	mode	of,	and	an	occasion	for,	a	second-person	experience	of	
Christ.2	
	
2.	 Fundamental	 location	 accounts	 of	 the	 real	 presence	 of	
Christ	in	the	Eucharist	
	
                                                
2	A	brief	word	about	terminology	would	be	helpful	here.	We’re	using	‘mode’	as	roughly	synonymous	
with	‘way’.	So,	a	mode	of	experiencing	a	person	is	a	particular	way	of	experiencing	them,	say,	in	
person,	over	Skype,	by	email	and	so	on.	An	occasion	for	experiencing	a	person	is	a	particular	time	
when	you	experienced	that	person,	say,	going	to	the	theatre	together	last	Thursday	evening.	
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	 If	a	fundamental	location	account	is	correct,	then	Christ	is	located	at	the	place	
occupied	by	 the	 consecrated	bread	 and	wine.	But	 how	 could	Christ	 be	 so	 located,	
given	 that	 the	 consecrated	 bread	 and	wine	 have	 all	 of	 the	 apparent	 properties	 of	
bread	and	wine	and	none	of	 the	apparent	properties	of	Christ?	Furthermore,	how	
could	Christ	be	multiply	located	given	that	Christ	is	fundamentally	located	at	both	of	
the	places	occupied	by	the	spatially	separated,	consecrated	bread	and	wine?	
	 Recently,	Alexander	Pruss	(2013)	and	Martin	Pickup	(2014)	have	addressed	
these	objections,	Pruss	the	former,	Pickup	the	latter,	in	terms	of	Christ	being	wholly	
present	in	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine,	and	have	argued	that	these	objections	can	
be	rebutted	successfully.	If	they	are	right	in	each	case,	then	an	account	of	the	Eucharist	
in	 terms	of	 fundamental	 location	 is	possible.	We	argue	 that	 their	 suggestions	 face	
serious	objections,	and	that	therefore,	an	alternative	is	well	motivated.	
	 Pruss	defines	‘being	wholly	present’	as	follows:	
	
(WP):	x	is	wholly	present	in	L	at	internal	time	t	if	and	only	if	x	exists	at	
t	and	every	intrinsic	feature	that	x	has	at	t	is	present	in	L	at	t.	
	
and	states	the	problem	it	gives	rise	to	for	the	metaphysics	of	the	Eucharist	as	follows:	
	
The	Catholic	view	is	that	Christ’s	body	and	blood	is	wholly	present	in	
the	location	of	the	Eucharistic	species.	But	by	[(WP)]	this	implies	that	
every	 intrinsic	 feature	of	Christ’s	body	and	blood	 is	present	 there	as	
well.	However,	Christ	has	a	certain	height	and	a	certain	mass.	Thus,	it	
seems,	a	certain	height	is	present	in	the	host	and	certain	mass.	Now,	the	
height	of	Christ	is	several	feet	and	his	mass	is	over	a	hundred	pounds.	
But	how	could	several	feet	of	height	be	found	in	such	a	small	place?	And	
we	certainly	do	not	observe	such	a	great	mass	in	the	host.	(Pruss	2013,	
70)	
	 	
	 Pruss’s	suggestion,	for	which	he	refers	us	to	his	previous	work	(Pruss	2009),	
is	that	features	like	height	and	weight	are	not,	in	fact,	intrinsic	properties.	He	gives	
two	reasons	for	thinking	so.	The	first,	he	tells	us,	is	that	‘[we]	learn	from	Einstein	that	
shape	and	size	depend	on	a	reference	frame’	(Pruss	2009,	530).	Now	we	do	indeed	
learn	 from	 Einstein	 that	 shape	 and	 size	 depend	 on	 a	 reference	 frame,	 but	 the	
conclusion	to	draw	from	that	is	far	from	obvious.	In	fact,	it	is	a	matter	of	considerable	
debate	in	the	philosophy	of	physics	whether	it	follows	that	there	is,	in	fact,	no	fact	of	
the	matter	concerning	size	and	shape.	The	debate	need	not	concern	us	here,	however,	
for	as	a	matter	of	fact	Pruss	is	simply	mistaken.	Einstein	teaches	us	that	at	very	high	
speeds	a	rectangle	will	appear	square;	but	no	matter	how	fast	the	rectangle	moves,	it	
will	never	appear	to	be	a	loaf	of	bread.	The	same	is	true	of	Christ’s	body:	Einstein	gave	
us	no	reason	to	think	that	Christ’s	human	body	could	have	the	extrinsic	shape	of	a	
communion	wafer.	
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	 The	second	reason	Pruss	gives	is	that	‘[we]	might	also	say	that	the	shape	and	
size	of	an	object	supervenes	on	the	positions	of	 its	parts’	(Pruss	2009,	530).	Pruss	
doesn’t	elaborate,	so	it	isn’t	clear	what	to	make	of	this	claim.	Intrinsic	properties,	as	
David	Lewis	defines	them,	are	properties	‘which	things	have	in	virtue	of	the	way	they	
themselves	are’	(1986,	61).	To	deny	that	something’s	shape	is	an	intrinsic	property	
because	shape	‘supervenes	on	the	position	of	its	parts’	isn’t	so	much	a	qualification	of	
the	distinction,	but	a	denial	of	it.	Pruss	is	right	that	things	have	the	shape	they	do	in	
virtue	of	 the	positions	of	 their	parts,	 but	 that	does	nothing	 to	 show	 that	 shape	 is,	
therefore,	not	intrinsic.	Theodore	Sider’s	words	are	apposite:	
	
…’intrinsic’	 is	 partially	 a	 term	 of	 art.	 Everyday	 use	 and	 the	 notion’s	
intended	 theoretical	 application	 provide	 some	 non-negotiable	
constraints	on	how	any	notion	deserving	 the	name	must	behave.	On	
any	 construal	 of	 intrinsicality,	 shape	 properties	 like	 being	 a	 perfect	
sphere	should	turn	out	intrinsic;	on	any	construal	properties	like	being	
within	10	feet	of	a	perfect	sphere	should	not	turn	out	intrinsic.	(1996,	
10)	
	
If	our	argument	is	successful,	and	Pruss’s	original	problem	still	stands,	the	obvious	
moral	 to	 draw	 from	 the	 discussion	 is	 to	 deny	 that	 which	 is	 forcing	 the	 problem,	
namely	 (WP):	 demanding	 that	 all	 of	 Christ’s	 intrinsic	 features	 be	 present	 in	 the	
Eucharistic	species	is	a	mistake.	Now	at	the	beginning	of	his	paper,	Pruss	writes,	‘[the]	
basic	relation	that	I	will	work	with	is	being	present	in	a	location’	–	and	indeed,	that	is	
the	problem.	Pruss	is	insisting	on	fundamental	location,	whereas,	in	fact,	derivative	
location	is	in	order.	However,	even	if	our	argument	is	unsuccessful,	Pruss	has	only	
shown	that	an	account	of	the	Eucharist	in	terms	of	fundamental	location	can	escape	
one	of	the	major	objections	to	it.	
	 Pickup	(2014)	attempts	another	solution.	He	provides	an	account	of	how,	for	
two	different	spatially-located	entities	A	(the	bread)	and	B	(the	wine),	it	can	be	the	
case	that:	
	
	 RP1:	A	and	B	are	each	the	whole	body	and	blood	of	Christ.	
	
According	to	Pickup’s	account,	RP1	can	be	understood	by	analogy	with	a	case	of	time	
travel	if	we	grant	the	logical	possibility	of	someone	hopping	into	a	time	machine	and	
reappearing	 at	 an	 earlier	 time	 alongside	 an	 earlier	 incarnation	 of	 themselves.	
Presumably	they	can	do	this	any	number	of	times,	and	so	it	is	possible	for	one	and	the	
same	 person,	 henceforth	 call	 her	 ‘Jane’,	 to	 be	 instantiated	 at	 some	 particular	
(external)	time	n	times	over,	for	any	n.	RP1	can	be	understood	analogously	to	such	a	
case,	where	A	and	B	correspond	to	two	different	instances	of	Jane.	If	the	time	travel	
case	is	possible,	argues	Pickup,	then	so	is	RP1.	
	 Apart	from	depending	on	the	possibility	of	time	travel,	which	is	controversial,	
we	have	some	additional	concerns	with	this	picture.	To	understand	these,	we	must	
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first	 distinguish	 between	 two	 different	 possible	 interpretations	 of	 time	 travel,	
between	 which	 Pickup	 hopes	 to	 remain	 neutral,	 namely,	 endurantism	 and	
perdurantism.	The	difference	between	endurantism	and	perdurantism,	for	the	sake	
of	this	paper,	will	simply	be	that	the	latter	accepts	the	existence	of	temporal	parts,	
while	the	former	rejects	them.	Examples	involving	time	travel	will	have	to	be	treated	
very	differently	by	endurantists	and	perdurantists.	We	first	consider	the	endurantist	
version.	
	 If	endurantism	is	true,	there	are	no	temporal	parts.	The	different	instances	of	
Jane	 in	 the	 time	 travel	 case,	 then,	 are	not	 temporal	parts	of	 Jane.	When	not	being	
careful	with	our	words,	we	may	describe	the	room	as	being	filled	with	n	number	of	
Janes.	However,	this	isn’t	quite	right	on	the	endurantist’s	view,	because	‘Jane’	refers	
to	the	single	enduring	woman.	There	aren’t	different	Janes,	but	one.	This	threatens	to	
become	very	awkward	for	Pickup’s	account	of	the	Eucharist,	for	we	might	similarly	
wonder	what	‘A’	and	‘B’	refer	to,	if	not	to	temporal	parts	of	the	enduring	body	and	
blood	of	Christ.	An	endurantist	might	propose	that	A	and	B	are	events	in	the	life	of	the	
body	and	blood	of	Christ	(this	seems	to	be	Brian	Leftow’s	(2004,	308)	view	of	the	Jane	
case).	But	that	can’t	be	right.	Events	cannot	be	broken,	eaten	or	drunk,	but	the	bread	
and	wine	can	(this	point	is	made	by	Hasker	(2009,	163)	against	Leftow’s	view).	More	
to	 the	 point,	 events	 cannot	 be	 bodies	 or	 blood,	 at	 least,	 not	 in	 anything	 like	 the	
ordinary	sense	of	those	terms.	An	endurantist	might	alternatively	say	that	A	and	B	are	
spatial,	but	not	temporal	parts	of	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ.	However,	this	won’t	
vindicate	RP1,	as	A	and	B	would	not	then	each	be	wholly	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ.	
The	only	endurantist	alternative	that	I	can	think	of	is	to	hold	that	‘A’	and	‘B’	do	simply	
refer	to	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	itself,	and	not	parts	or	events	of	that	body	and	
blood.	This	would	entail	that	A=B,	that	is,	that	the	consecrated	bread	is	numerically	
identical	with	the	consecrated	wine.	But	is	it	plausible	to	say	that	the	bread	and	the	
wine	 are	 identical?	 Christians	 who	 believe	 in	 the	 real	 presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	
Eucharist	 often	 speak	 of	 ‘the	 two	 species	 of	 the	 Eucharist’.	 It	 seems	 difficult	 to	
understand	 how	 there	 are	 two	 species	 (namely	 the	 bread	 and	 the	 wine)	 of	 the	
Eucharist	on	an	altar	unless	the	bread	is	non-identical	with	the	wine.	Perhaps	A	and	
B	are	the	same	enduring	object	but	falling	under	different	phase	sortals	(‘bread’	and	
‘wine’,	if	these	are	in	fact	sortals),	but	it	isn’t	entirely	clear	how	an	endurance	theorist	
can	make	sense	of	A	and	B	falling	under	different	phase	sortals	in	a	way	which	doesn’t	
first	 involve	distinguishing	between	A	 and	B,	 and	 this	 raises	 the	problem	all	 over	
again.	
	 We	 grant	 that	 the	 situation	 is	 better	 on	 the	 perdurantism	 version	 of	 the	
analogy.	If	perdurantism	is	true,	according	to	Pickup,	we	can	conceive	of	the	body	and	
blood	of	Christ	as	a	perduring	object,	while	conceiving	of	A	and	B	as	temporal	parts	
of	this	object.	According	to	the	perdurantist	view,	A	and	B	would	not	be	absolutely	
identical	with	each	other	or	with	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ.	A	and	B	would	both	
satisfy	 (WP),	 Pruss’s	 definition	 of	 whole	 presence.	 However,	 opponents	 of	 multi-
location	might	point	out	 that	 the	perdurantist	account	of	 the	 time	travel	case	may	
simply	suggest	that	(WP)	is	too	weak	a	definition	of	whole	presence.	If	there	was	some	
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external	time	t	at	which	A	and	B	both	existed,	at	locations	L1	and	L2	respectively,	as	
temporal	parts	of	some	perduring	object,	then	where	is	the	perduring	object	located?	
Surely	at	both.	But	if	this	is	true,	then,	it	might	be	objected,	A	and	B	must	also	be	spatial	
as	 well	 as	 temporal	 parts	 of	 the	 perduring	 objects.	 This,	 it	 might	 be	 thought,	 is	
sufficient	on	its	own	to	show	that	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	isn’t	wholly	located	in	
either	A	or	B.	
	 We	grant	that	this	is	by	no	means	a	knock-down	objection,	and	it	isn’t	intended	
as	such.	Pickup	may	well	have	the	resources	to	respond	to	the	worries	that	we	think	
confront	 his	 proposal.	 However,	 the	 reliance	 of	 this	 account	 on	 both	 the	 logical	
possibility	 of	 time	 travel	 and	 multi-location,	 both	 of	 which	 face	 well	 known	
objections,	 is	 inescapable	 and	 is	 perhaps	 the	most	 serious	 cause	 for	 concern.	We	
conclude	 that	 the	 fundamental-location	 accounts	 of	 the	 Eucharist	 in	 the	
contemporary	literature	face	several	serious	worries,	and	we	think	this	provides	a	
good	motivation	for	developing	an	alternative	in	terms	of	derivative	location.	
	
	 	
3.	A	derivative	location	account:	receptionism	
	
	 Having	argued	that	neither	Pruss	nor	Pickup	successfully	rebut	objections	to	
a	fundamental	location	account	of	Christ’s	real	presence	in	the	Eucharist,	we	propose	
a	 derivative	 location	 account,	 one	 on	 which	 the	 consecrated	 bread	 and	wine	 can	
occasion	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 experience	 of	 Christ,	 namely,	 a	 second-person	
experience	of	Christ,	that	is,	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine	are	a	mode	of,	and	an	
occasion	 for,	 a	 communicant	 to	 experience	 Christ	 as	 a	 person.	 In	 essence,	 the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine	are	icons	by	means	of	which	communicant	and	Christ	
share	attention	with	each	other.	Let	us	remind	ourselves	of	what	it	is	for	an	object	x	
to	be	derivatively	located	at	a	place	p:	
	
Derivative	Location:	x	is	located	at	p	derivatively	=df	x	is	located	at	p	in	
virtue	of	standing	in	some	relation(s),	R(s),	to	some	distinct	entity,	y,	
where	y	is	located	at	p	fundamentally.	
	
On	the	view	we	favour,	Christ	(x)	is	derivatively	located	at	the	place	occupied	by	the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine	(p)	in	virtue	of	standing	in	an	‘iconic’	relation	(R)	to	the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine	which	is	located	at	p	fundamentally,	where	x	stands	in	
an	iconic	relation	to	y	just	in	case	y	is	a	mode	of,	and	an	occasion	for,	a	second-person	
experience	of	x.	More	simply,	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine	are	a	mode	of,	and	an	
occasion	 for,	 a	 second-person	 experience	 of	 Christ.	 To	 unpack	 this	 view,	 we	 first	
explain	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 second-person	 experience	 by	 employing	 Stump’s	 (2010)	
analysis	of	this	concept.	We	then	discuss	how	spiritual	practices	can	occasion	second-
person	 experiences	 of	God	by	discussing	Adam	Green	 and	Keith	A.	Quan’s	 (2012)	
account	of	experiencing	God	through	Scripture.	We	conclude	by	applying	this	account	
to	our	understanding	of	Christ’s	derivative	location	in	the	Eucharistic	elements.		
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	 In	Stump’s	account	of	God’s	omnipresence,	she	notes	that	as	well	as	being	able	
to	describe	a	person’s	presence	in	relation	to	a	space	and	a	time	in	terms	of	present	
in	 and	 present	 at,	we	 can	 also	 add	 a	 kind	 of	 second-personal	 presence,	 namely,	
present	to.	This	kind	of	presence	is	lacking	when	someone	is	present	in	a	space	and	
at	 a	 time	 but	 isn’t	 present	 to	 the	 other	 persons	 in	 the	 room.	 For	 instance,	 to	 use	
Stump’s	example,	we	might	say	that	‘She	read	the	paper	all	through	dinner	and	was	
never	present	to	any	of	the	rest	of	us’	(2013,	64).	What	is	lacking	here	isn’t	the	agent’s	
presence	 in	 a	 space	 or	 at	 a	 time,	 but	 rather,	 it	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘second-personal	
psychological	 connection’	with	 the	 other	 persons	 in	 the	 room.	 Stump	 defines	 this	
account	of	second-personal	experience	in	more	detail	in	Wandering	in	Darkness.	As	
she	describes	it	here,	Paula	has	a	second-person	experience	of	Jerome	only	if	
	
1.! Paula	is	aware	of	Jerome	as	a	person.	
2.! Paula’s	personal	interaction	with	Jerome	is	of	a	direct	and	immediate	
	 sort.	
3.! Jerome	is	conscious.	(2010,	75-76)	
	
What	is	it	to	interact	personally	with	another	person	in	a	direct	and	immediate	sort?	
And	what	is	lacking	from	Paula’s	failing	to	share	attention	with	Jerome	by	reading	the	
paper	all	through	dinner?	Part	of	Stump’s	answer	to	these	questions	is	that	in	order	
to	have	second-person	experience,	persons	must	share	attention	with	one	another.	
Shared-attention,	put	briefly,	is	a	kind	of	mutual	awareness	between	persons,	this	is	
the	kind	of	experience	infants	and	caregivers	have	through	engaging	in	mutual	eye	
contact	 with	 one	 another,	 for	 example.3	 Stump	 argues	 that	 we	 can	 understand	
omnipresence	 in	these	terms:	 ‘[i]n	one	and	the	same	eternal	present,	omnipresent	
God	is	available	to	share	attention	with	any	person	at	any	place	in	any	time’	(2013,	
71).		
	 Although	we	are	not	interested	here	in	defending	Stump’s	derivative	account	
of	omnipresence,	we	think	that	it	provides	a	helpful	way	of	thinking	about	Christ’s	
presence	at	the	Eucharist.	On	this	iconic	understanding	of	Christ’s	presence,	it’s	not	
Christ’s	 presence	 in	 a	 place	 or	 at	 a	 time	 which	 is	 important,	 but	 rather,	 Christ’s	
presence	 to	 the	 individual	 through	 a	 kind	 of	 attention	 sharing.	 As	 Martin	 Luther	
writes	in	his	discussion	of	Christ’s	presence	at	the	Eucharist,	‘it	is	one	thing	if	God	is	
present,	and	another	if	he	is	present	for	you’	(1961).4	This	presence	to	an	individual	
is	the	kind	of	presence	we	think	that	 it	 is	 important	to	explain.	How	can	we	adopt	
Stump’s	account	of	attention	sharing	to	our	understanding	Christ’s	presence	in	the	
                                                
3	There	is	a	great	deal	of	secondary	literature	on	the	philosophy	and	psychology	of	joint-attention	(or	
shared-attention)	between	persons.	See	for	instance	Naomi	Elian,	Christoph	Hoerl,	Teresa	
McCormack	and	Johannes	Roessler	(eds),	2005	as	well	as	Axel	Seemann	(ed)	2012.	Since	our	account	
doesn’t	depend	on	the	psychology	of	joint-attention	to	be	correct,	we	avoid	going	into	too	much	
detail	here.	
4	For	another,	similar	account	of	Christ’s	presence	to	the	individual	at	the	Eucharist,	see	Kierkegaard	
2011.	
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Eucharist?	And	how	can	bread	or	wafers	and	a	sip	of	wine	allow	us	 to	experience	
Christ	in	this	way?		
	 To	see	how	the	Eucharist	can	provide	us	with	a	mode	of,	and	an	occasion	for,	
sharing	attention	with	Christ,	 consider	another	application	of	 the	second-personal	
model	 of	 religious	 experience,	 namely,	 Green	 and	 Quan’s	 (2012)	 account	 of	
experiencing	 God	 through	 Scripture.5	 According	 to	 Green	 and	 Quan,	 one	 way	 of	
understanding	the	claim	that	God	is	present	in,	and	speaking	through	Scripture	is	to	
maintain	that	Scripture	gives	us	a	mode	of,	and	an	occasion	for,	a	shared	attention	
experience	with	God.	First,	 it	will	be	 important	 to	give	a	more	detailed	account	of	
shared-attention.	As	Green	and	Quan	outline	it,	‘shared	attention	occurs	when	one	is	
engaged	in	an	act	of	attending	to	something	and,	in	doing	so,	one	is	cooperating	with	
another	 who	 is	 engaged	 in	 a	 parallel	 act	 of	 attending.	 Shared	 attention	 involves	
coordinated	 “attention-focusing”’	 (2012,	 419).	 This	 kind	 of	 shared	 attention	 can	
either	be	dyadic,	in	which	case	two	individuals	focus	attention	only	on	one	another,	
or	 triadic,	 in	which	case	both	attendants	 focus	on	an	 independent	object	or	event.	
Further,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 shared-attention	 is	 coordinated	 attention	 rather	 than	
merely	‘mutual	object	focusing’	(Brinck	2001,	262).	When	a	mother	and	child	share	
eye	contact	they	enjoy	dyadic	shared-attention.	If	the	child	points	to	a	bright	light	in	
the	room	and	the	mother	follows	her	gaze	there	is	mutual	object	focusing.	When	the	
child	looks	back	to	see	that	her	mother	has	followed	her	gaze,	there	is	triadic	shared	
attention.	 Cooperation	 is	 a	 crucial	 component	 of	 shared	 attention	 and	 thus	 if	 the	
mother	leaves	the	room	whilst	the	child	looks	over	to	the	bright	light,	the	experience	
will	be	a	very	different	one.	According	to	Green	and	Quan	‘the	cooperation	of	the	other	
in	attending	is	a	phenomenal	constituent	of	the	experience	of	shared	attention	itself’	
(2012,	420).		
	 With	 this	 model	 in	 place,	 Green	 and	 Quan	 discuss	 more	 specifically	 how	
written	text	may	allow	one	to	share	attention.	They	consider	the	following	two	cases:	
	
Case	1	
Becky	likes	to	cook	along	with	the	Rachael	Ray	show.	The	show	is	on	
the	Spanish-speaking	channel	during	her	dinner	hour,	and	Becky	does	
not	speak	Spanish,	so	she	follows	the	English	subtitles.	When	Ray	says	
“Consider	the	golden	brown	crust	of	this	zucchini	bake”	Becky	is	able	
to	use	her	abilities	 to	engage	 in	shared	attention	as	mediated	by	 the	
subtitles	to	attend	to	the	zucchini	bake	pictured	on	the	screen.	She	then	
imagines	what	 Rachael	 Ray	would	 say	 about	 the	 zucchini	 bake	 that	
Becky	is	cooking	and	is	led	to	look	at	the	crust	of	her	own	zucchini	bake,	
pondering	whether	it	is	golden	brown	as	it	should	be.	
	
Case	2	
                                                
5	For	another	account	of	second-personal	experience,	but	applied	to	religious	art,	see	David	Efird	and	
Daniel	Gustafsson	2015.	
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Alex	wins	 a	 private	 cooking	 lesson	with	 Rachael	 Ray.	 He	 is	 deaf,	 so	
Rachael	communicates	with	him	using	written	notes.	At	a	certain	point	
in	 the	 lesson,	 she	hands	him	a	note	 that	 reads,	 “Consider	 the	golden	
brown	 crust	 of	 this	 zucchini	 bake,”	 at	 which	 point	 he	 attends	 with	
Rachael	to	the	crust.	He	looks	back	at	Rachael	who	smiles	and	holds	out	
a	note	between	them	that	reads,	“You	done	good.”	(2012,	423)	
	
In	Case	1,	Becky	doesn’t	share	attention	with	Rachael	Ray,	since	Ray	isn’t	present	for	
her	to	share	attention	with.	However,	she	uses	the	same	abilities	that	she	uses	when	
genuinely	 sharing	 attention	with	 another	 person.	 Becky’s	 reading	 of	 the	 subtitles	
allows	her	to	focus	on	the	object	of	attention	which	Rachel	Ray	wishes	her	audience	
to	 focus	on	and	also	 to	 ‘navigate	her	own	environment	 in	 light	of	what	 she	 reads’	
(2012,	423).	According	to	Green	and	Quan,	Case	2	is	an	example	of	genuine	shared	
attention;	the	first	note	which	Alex	reads	functions	much	like	a	child’s	point	towards	
the	light	and	is	an	example	of	triadic	shared	attention	mediated	by	text.	The	second	
note	 is	 an	 example	 of	 dyadic	 shared	 attention	 in	 which	 Alex	 and	 Rachel	 share	
attention	with	one	another.		
	 These	examples	serve	as	the	basis	for	the	distinction	which	Green	and	Quan	
make	 between	 ‘genuine’	 and	 ‘pseudo’	 shared-attention.	 Pseudo-shared-attention	
isn’t	 an	 illusion	 of	 shared	 attention,	 but	 rather,	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘as	 if’	 attention	 sharing	
whereby	the	individual	‘processes	an	input	in	an	“as	if”	mode	(e.g.,	“as	if”	the	person	
on	the	TV	were	present’	(2012,	423).	Genuine	shared	attention	through	text	occurs	
when	two	individuals	cooperate	in	attention	sharing	in	either	the	dyadic	or	triadic	
variety.	They	extend	this	taxonomy	of	genuine	shared	attention	further	by	dividing	
this	experience	into	an	‘instrumental’	and	‘constitutive’	shared	attention.	They	give	
the	following	example	to	demonstrate	this	difference:	
	
if	Rachael	Ray	hands	Alex	a	note	that	says,	“My	producer	Buddy	is	in	
the	next	room	and	he	wants	to	give	you	a	new	blender,”	Alex	may	then	
be	 empowered	 by	 the	 note	 to	 have	 dyadic	 and	 triadic	 shared	
experiences	with	Buddy,	 but	 the	note	 is	 not	 part	 of	 any	 cooperative	
activity	shared	by	Alex	and	Buddy.	The	note	is	only	a	means	of	putting	
Alex	in	a	position	to	engage	in	shared	attention	with	Buddy.	(2012,	422)	
	
An	 instrumental	 shared-attention	 experience	 is	 different	 from	 a	 pseudo-shared-
attention	experience	in	that	it	alerts	Alex	to	an	actual	agent	(Buddy)	who	is	available	
to	share	attention	with	him.		
	 With	 these	 distinctions	 outlined,	 Green	 and	 Quan	 consider	 the	 theological	
claim	that	God	speaks	through	or	is	present	in	the	text	found	in	Scripture.	According	
to	Green	and	Quan,	if	text	can	allow	us	to	share	attention	in	various	degrees	with	other	
persons,	 then	the	same	can	be	 true	of	God.	For	 instance,	one	might	have	a	kind	of	
pseudo-shared-attention	 experience	 with	 God	 when	 one	 reads	 the	 story	 of	 the	
healing	of	the	paralysed	man	in	the	Gospel	according	to	Mark,	chapter	2;	we	might	
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imagine	ourselves	in	the	position	of	the	man	and	read	the	words	‘Son,	your	sins	are	
forgiven’	as	if	they	are	being	spoken	directly	to	us.	However,	according	to	Green	and	
Quan,	pseudo-shared-experience	cannot	account	fully	for	God’s	continuing	presence	
and	 speaking	 through	 Scripture.	 Pseudo-shared-attention	 is	 possible	 with	 other	
literary	 texts,	 such	 as	 Plato’s	 account	 of	 Socrates	 in	 the	 Republic,	 for	 example.	
However,	‘[t]he	Christian	tradition	appears	to	assert	that	Scripture	is	unique	in	that	
God	is	actually	present	and	speaking	in	Scripture,	not	just	that	Scripture	lends	itself	
toward	 imagining	 that	God	 is	present	and	speaking’	 (2012,	425).	Thus,	Green	and	
Quan	 claim	 that	 Scripture	 can	 also	 act	 as	 an	 instrumental	 shared-attention	
experience,	 alerting	 one	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 an	 agent	 (God)	 who	 is	 able	 to	 share-
attention	with	you,	much	like	the	previous	example	of	passing	a	note.	For	example,	
‘[w]hen	the	psalmist	writes,	“Taste	and	see	that	the	Lord	is	good,”	it	represents	the	
world	as	being	a	place	that	includes	a	divine	being	whose	goodness	is	available	for	
the	experiencing’	(2012,	425).	It	 is	even	possible,	Green	and	Quan	argue,	to	have	a	
constitutive	shared-attention	experience	with	God:	
	
Much	 like	Rachael	Ray	hands	Alex	a	note	about	 the	zucchini	bake	 to	
direct	 his	 attention	 to	 the	 zucchini	 bake	 in	 Case	 2,	 so	 God	 might,	
through	the	Scriptures,	direct	one’s	attention	to	one’s	pride.	Just	as	Ray	
hands	 Alex	 a	 note	 saying	 he	 “done	 good”	 that	 shapes	 how	 Alex	
experiences	Ray’s	kindly	smile,	so	God	might	elect	for	the	contents	of	
Scripture	to	shape	a	dyadic	experience	of	the	divine.	Shared	attention	
requires	that	the	agent	one	is	sharing	attention	with	be	experienced	as	
present,	even	if	implicitly.	Thus,	the	constitutive	reading	draws	a	tight	
link	between	the	role	that	the	text	plays	in	facilitating	shared	attention	
and	God’s	being	present.	(2012,	426)	
	
Green	and	Quan	note	that	whilst	‘as	if’	experiences	might	be	the	most	common,	it	is	
possible	for	these	experiences	to	act	as	a	prime	for	us	to	experience	scripture	in	an	
instrumental	 and	 constitutive	way.	Pseudo,	 or	 ‘as	 if’,	 shared-attention	experiences	
encourage	us	to	engage	with	Scripture	and	to	enter	into	the	‘cooperative	activity	with	
the	divine	in	which	God	uses	the	text	of	the	Scriptures	to	reveal	Himself	dyadically	or	
triadically’.	Thus,	the	model	of	experiencing	God	through	Scripture	which	Green	and	
Quan	present,	allows	for	a	kind	of	progressive	experience	of	God—starting	with	the	
facilitation	 of	 an	 imaginary,	 or	 ‘as	 if’	 experience,	 and	 working	 towards	 genuine	
constitutive	shared	attention.	The	advantage	of	this	is	that	the	model	isn’t	an	all	or	
nothing	approach;	whilst	it	is	true	that	God	is	only	really	present	when	he	is	present	
to	the	individual	constitutively,	the	other	modes	of	attention-sharing	may	facilitate	
this	kind	of	experience	in	the	future.	
	 Now,	whilst	 it	might	be	clear	how	two	persons	can	share-attention	through	
sharing	eye	contact,	 for	 instance,	 it	might	be	more	difficult	 to	grasp	how	a	person	
could	attend	to	the	mind	of	God	in	the	same	way.	We	cannot	share	eye	contact	with	
God	or	perceive	God’s	body	language	in	the	same	way	that	Alex	interacts	with	Rachel	
Experiencing	the	Real	Presence	of	Christ	in	the	Eucharist	 Joshua	Cockayne,	David	Efird	
Gordon	Haynes,	August	Ludwigs	
	 Daniel	Molto,	Richard	Tamburro	
	 Jack	Warman	
	 	
	
12	
 
Ray.	 All	 of	 the	 above	 examples	 of	 sharing-attention	 involve	 persons	 who	 are	
fundamentally	located	nearby	to	one	another.	However,	we	have	claimed	that	Christ	
cannot	be	fundamentally	located	in	the	Eucharistic	meal.		
	 Whilst	many	 of	 the	 examples	 given	 by	Green	 and	Quan	 are	 cases	 in	which	
persons	 can	 direct	 perceive	 one	 another,	 nearness	 of	 fundamental	 location	 is	 not	
necessary	 for	 the	 model	 of	 shared-attention	 they	 employ.	 As	 Green	 explains	 this	
model	elsewhere,		
	
the	pattern	of	one's	experience	appears	to	manifest	a	shared	awareness	
between	the	divine	and	oneself	within	which	affect	and	information	can	
be	 communicated.	 […]	 [U]sing	 the	 shared-attention	 account,	we	 can	
claim	 that	 sound,	 light,	 and	 affect	 are	 all	 mediums	 that	 can	 be	
manipulated	by	God	in	such	a	way	as	to	reveal	the	mind	of	God	toward	
the	subject	of	 the	experience.	The	subject	hears	the	sound	of	a	voice	
reading	 a	 psalm	 that	 responds	 to	 his	 situation,	 a	 manipulation	 of	
auditory	stimulation	that	evidences	an	awareness	and	concern	for	the	
subject	by	some	theistically	affiliated	entity.	He	or	she	then	experiences	
an	unnatural	light	which	seems	patterned	to	reinforce	the	extra-natural	
nature	of	the	reassuring	voice.	Then,	the	subject	has	the	experience	as	
of	being	loved	and	then	one	of	peace,	perhaps	through	the	activation	of	
the	subject's	mirror	neurons	or	perhaps	in	another	way.	The	preceding	
pattern	of	light	and	audition	does	not	seem	epistemically	incidental	to	
the	experience	of	being	loved.	The	shared-attention	model	allows	the	
preceding	 pattern	 of	 sensory	 imagery	 to	 enter	 into	 how	 one	
experiences	whatever	qualia	were	present	in	the	experience	such	that	
it	is	experienced	as	being	loved	by	God.	(2002,	463-464)	
		
The	shared-attention	model	of	religious	experience	depends	on	a	person’s	ordinary	
perception	 of	 the	world,	 but	 unlike	 all	 of	 the	 above	 examples	 of	 shared-attention	
between	 human	 persons,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 divine-human	 shared	 attention	 what	 is	
perceived	is	not	the	body	of	God.	As	Green	describes	it,	a	person	becomes	aware	of	
God’s	personal	presence	in	a	mystical	way,	but	through	her	ordinary	experiences	of	
the	word.			
	 If	Green’s	model	is	a	feasible	explanation	of	experiences	of	divine	presence	and	
if	 text	 can	 allow	 us	 to	 share-attention	 with	 another	 person	 (including	 a	 divine	
disembodied	person),	then	so	too	can	an	object	or	an	event,	we	think.	Green’s	model	
of	 mystical	 experience	 can	 be	 extended	 beyond	 sharing-attention	 through	 text.	
Objects	 often	 portray	 meaning	 in	 a	 rich	 and	 evocative	 way,	 and	 allow	 for	
intersubjective	experience.	Consider	a	further	example	of	attention-sharing:		
	
Case	3	
Alex	and	Rachael	have	been	married	for	50	years.	On	their	first	date,	
Alex	cooked	Rachael	a	steak	with	peppercorn	sauce	and	green	beans.	
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Recently,	 they	 have	 been	 having	 difficulties	 in	 their	 marriage,	 but	
decide	to	devote	the	evening	to	spend	together.	Alex	comes	in	the	room	
and	 looks	 at	 Rachael,	 and	 presents	 her	 with	 a	 plate	 of	 steak	 with	
peppercorn	sauce	and	green	beans.	Rachael	looks	back	at	Alex,	without	
saying	anything	and	smiles	at	him,	whilst	placing	her	hand	over	her	ring	
finger.		
	
Now,	just	as	in	the	Rachael	Ray	cases,	in	this	case,	nothing	is	spoken	and	an	observer	
might	miss	the	significance	of	this	interaction.	However,	in	the	presentation	of	certain	
actions	and	the	repetition	of	past	acts,	Alex	is	able	to	share-attention	with	Rachael	in	
a	way	which	far	surpasses	what	he	could	have	written	in	a	card	or	said	in	words.	The	
mutual	 focus	 on	 an	 object	 allows	 for	 Alex	 and	 Rachael	 to	 share-attention	 both	
dyadically	 (mutual	 awareness)	 and	 triadically	 (mutual	 object	 awareness),	
furthermore	 it	 is	 an	 experience	 which	 allows	 Alex	 to	 communicate	 something	
important	 to	 Rachael	 without	 using	 text	 or	 speech.	 Clearly,	 if	 text	 can	 allow	 for	
meaningful	shared-attention	between	persons,	then	so	too	can	objects	and	events.		
	 The	application	to	the	Eucharist	should	seem	obvious	by	now.	We	have	shown	
that	according	to	Green	and	Quan,	the	reading	of	a	piece	of	text	can	allow	for	mystical	
attention-sharing	with	God.	We	have	also	shown	that	an	analogue	of	this	experience	
can	be	had	through	the	experience	of	a	significant	event.	Thus,	it	follows	that	some	
kind	 of	 event	 could	 also	 allow	 for	 an	 experience	 of	 a	 divine	 person	 who	 is	 not	
fundamentally	located	nearby	to	the	perceiver.	Now	let’s	see	how	this	can	be	applied	
to	our	understanding	of	the	Eucharist.		
	 For	the	Christian	believer,	the	Eucharistic	meal	has	a	significance	much	like	
the	 significance	 of	 Alex’s	 reconciliation	 meal	 with	 his	 wife.	 The	 Eucharist	 is	 a	
reconciliation	meal—it’s	 content	 is	 focused	 on	 Christ’s	 sacrifice	 on	 the	 cross,	 the	
forgiveness	of	the	participant’s	sins	and	the	possibility	of	closer	union	with	Christ.	
This	will	sometimes	be	formalised	by	means	of	liturgy	which	focuses	the	participant’s	
attention	onto	 these	components	of	 the	sacrament,	but	as	with	Alex	and	Rachael’s	
reconciliation	 meal,	 clearly	 propositional	 content	 isn’t	 necessary	 for	 this	 kind	 of	
attention	sharing.	Through	the	Eucharistic	elements,	the	participant	is	able	to	focus	
her	attention	on	Christ	in	a	way	which	is	very	similar,	albeit	in	some	ways	different,	
to	 that	 of	 the	way	 text	 can	 occasion	 attention	 sharing	 between	 persons.	 Notably,	
however,	 as	 with	 Alex	 and	 Rachael’s	 meal,	 what	 is	 communicated	 isn’t	 a	 set	 of	
propositions,	 but	 the	 sacrament	 will	 have	 a	 different	 meaning	 depending	 on	 the	
participant’s	relation	to	Christ.		
		 Green	and	Quan’s	model	of	attention-sharing	through	text	gives	us	a	helpful	
dichotomy	to	outline	the	kinds	of	experience	that	the	Eucharist	might	allow	for.	As	
with	their	discussion	of	experiencing	God	through	Scripture,	these	experiences	can	
function	progressively,	starting	with	pseudo	shared-attention	experiences,	and	then	
eventually	allowing	the	individual	to	have	a	constitutive	shared-attention	experience	
through	 participating	 in	 the	 Eucharist.	 We’ll	 outline	 these	 different	 levels	 of	
experience,	but	it’s	important	to	note	(as	with	Scripture)	that	in	order	to	make	sense	
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of	 the	 claim	 that	 Christ	 is	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 only	 a	 constitutive	 shared-
attention	experience	will	do.	So	whilst	pseudo	and	instrumental	experiences	might	
enable	an	individual	to	eventually	experience	Christ	constitutively,	they	won’t	count	
as	 examples	 of	 Christ	 being	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 by	 being	 present	 to	 the	
participant.		
	 First,	then,	it	is	obvious	that	participation	in	the	Eucharist	can	occasion	an	‘as	
if’	 or	 pseudo	 shared-attention	 experience,	whereby	 the	 participant	 focuses	 on	 the	
death	of	Christ	and	the	forgiveness	of	sins	when	she	partakes	in	the	sacrament.	When	
she	hears	the	words	 ‘Take,	eat;	this	is	my	body	which	is	broken	for	you:	this	do	in	
remembrance	of	me’	(1	Corinthians	11.24),	she	receives	the	bread	and	wine	as	if	it	is	
given	 to	 her	 from	 Christ	 at	 the	 Last	 Supper.	 Secondly,	 the	 Eucharist	 can	 also	 be	
thought	of	instrumentally.	In	this	regard	the	participant	eats	the	bread	and	drinks	the	
wine	and	this	reminds	her	that	Christ	died	for	her,	and	what’s	more,	that	his	presence	
is	active	today,	that	is,	that	he	is	a	living	agent	with	whom	we	can	share	attention	with.	
The	words	of	the	Anglican	liturgy	seek	to	remind	the	individual	of	God’s	presence;	in	
response	to	the	priest’s	words:	‘The	Lord	is	Here’,	the	congregation	reply	‘His	Spirit	
is	 With	 Us’	 (Common	 Worship	 2000,	 176).6	 These	 two	 kinds	 of	 experience	 seem	
uncontentious,	 but	 not	 sufficient	 for	 the	 account	 of	 derivative	 presence	 we	 have	
defended.		
	 For	 the	model	 we	 propose,	 it	 is	 important	 not	 only	 that	 the	 participant	 is	
reminded	that	Christ	is	present,	but	also	that	she	actually	experiences	him	as	being	
present.	 Much	 like	 Alex	 and	 Rachael	 share	 attention	 which	 is	 focused	 on	 a	
reconciliation	 meal,	 Alex	 and	 Christ	 must	 share	 attention	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	
Eucharistic	meal,	which	is	able	to	bring	about	reconciliation	between	them.	Clearly,	
unlike	with	Rachael,	Alex	cannot	share-attention	with	Christ	by	means	of	eye	contact,	
since	 Christ	 isn’t	 visibly	 present.	 Nevertheless,	 Alex	 can	 still	 be	 aware	 of	 Christ’s	
presence	to	him.	The	advantage	of	a	shared-attention	model	of	religious	experience	
is	that	we	don’t	have	to	postulate	any	kind	of	mystical	sensory	apparatus.	But	rather,	
we	can	have	an	experience	of	someone	as	present	to	us	through	a	number	of	different	
media.7	Stump	(2010,	77)	claims	that	even	an	email	exchange	can	allow	for	second-
personal	 experience.	 For	 Alex’s	 participation	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 to	 count	 as	 an	
experience	of	Christ	as	present	to	him,	he	must	be	aware	that	Christ	is	present	and	
that	Christ	is	attending	to	him.	As	Søren	Kierkegaard	puts	it,	‘[i]n	the	physical	sense,	
one	can	point	to	the	Communion	table	and	say,	“there	it	is”;	but	in	the	spiritual	sense,	
it	 is	actually	there	only	 if	you	hear	his	voice	there’	 (2011,	271).	 In	partaking	in	the	
bread	and	wine,	Alex	can	be	aware	that	Christ	is	aware	of	him	and	he	can	be	reminded	
of	the	act	of	grace	which	Christ	performed	on	the	cross,	or	of	some	unconfessed	sin	in	
his	heart	through	the	powerful	repetition	of	Christ’s	last	meal.	He	is	aware	that	Christ	
                                                
6	The	role	of	the	Trinity	in	the	experience	of	Christ	in	the	Eucharist	is	an	issue	which	we	don’t	have	
space	to	address	in	this	paper.	As	we	describe	it,	the	Father	makes	the	Son	present	to	the	individual	
by	the	power	of	the	Holy	Spirit.	Thus,	the	congregation’s	use	of	‘His’	in	the	reply	that	‘His	Spirit	is	
With	Us’	should	be	interpreted	specifically	as	referring	to	Christ.		
7	See	Adam	Green	2009,	455-457	for	a	defence	of	this	claim.		
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too	is	present	and	focusing	on	this	meal	and	the	things	that	stand	in	the	way	of	their	
reconciliation.	The	elements	occasion	both	a	dyadic	and	triadic	shared	attention	of	
Christ	and	Christ	is	derivatively	present	in	the	Eucharistic	elements.		
	 Whilst	 the	 Eucharist	 always	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 occasion	 this	 kind	 of	
constitutive	 shared-attention	 with	 Christ,	 it	 might	 not	 always	 be	 successful	 in	
producing	the	rich	kind	of	experience	described	by	a	genuine	dyadic	or	triadic	shared-
attention.	Communicants	may	enter	into,	and	experience	this	union—the	richness	of	
the	 relationship,	 to	 varying	 degrees.	 This	 may	 be	 because	 of	 their	 maturity	 in	
understanding	their	relationship	with	Christ,	and	their	own	need	for	God.	But	it	may	
also	be	due	to	inattention	to	some	or	all	aspects	of	how	Christ	is	presenting	himself	
to	them—the	communicant	may	just	not	be	receptive	at	that	time.	It	may	be	that	the	
factors	that	are	inhibiting	the	person’s	awareness	and	receptivity	may	be	due	to	the	
service	being	conducted	in	an	unfamiliar	tradition,	or	in	a	community	to	which	the	
person	 doesn’t	 yet	 belong.	 Thus,	 although	 a	 person	 may	 participate	 in	 a	 church	
service,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	they	have	necessarily	experienced	a	certain	degree	of,	
or	indeed	any,	union	with	the	present	person	of	Christ.	As	Green	and	Quan	(2012)	
have	demonstrated,	how	much	experience,	or	awareness,	of	the	presence	of	Christ	
there	is	can	vary.	But	wherever	some	real	union	has	taken	place	that	encompasses	to	
some	minimal	 degree	 the	 essential	 aspects	 of	 the	meal	 Jesus	was	 instituting	 (the	
experiences	 of	 the	 need	 for	 redemption,	 of	 God	 as	 the	 provider	 of	 redemption,	 of	
participation	in	the	security	of	covenantal	relationship,	and	of	eschatological	hope)	
then	Christ	has	been	truly	present	and	the	Eucharist	has	been	truly	celebrated.8	
	 In	 the	 concluding	 sections	 of	 this	 paper,	 we	 address	 two	 important	 issues	
which	face	an	iconic	model	of	Christ’s	presence	in	the	Eucharist.	First,	we	respond	to	
the	 question	 of	 what	 makes	 the	 Eucharist	 distinct	 from	 other	 instances	 of	
experiencing	Christ’s	presence.	And	second,	we	ask	whether	our	model	can	actually	
explain	the	doctrine	of	Christ’s	presence	in	the	Eucharist,	and	if	it	can,	we	ask,	where	
precisely	is	Christ	supposed	to	be	located?		
	
	
4.	What	makes	the	Eucharist	special?	
	
	 One	 advantage	 of	 focussing	 on	 the	 actual	 interpersonal	 interactions	
experienced	is	that	we	are	able	to	connect	the	experience	and	benefits	of	participation	
in	 the	Eucharistic	meal	with	 the	 interactions	 and	benefits	 occurring	 in	 the	 rest	 of	
Christian	spirituality,	both	within	a	sacramental	framework,	and	beyond.9	The	nature	
                                                
8	We	don’t	have	time	to	discuss	a	further	corollary	of	this	claim,	but	it	is	worth	noting:	there	is	
nothing	in	what	we	have	said	that	would	prohibit	this	meal	being	celebrated	with	a	bottle	of	Coke	
and	a	bag	of	crisps.	Although	people	in	many	(probably	most)	traditions	would	find	this	practice	so	
unusual	and	unsettling	as	to	disrupt	their	ability	to	relate	the	elements	to	the	meaning	they	would	
usually	confer	on	bread	and	wine,	it	is	in	principle	possible	for	Christ	to	be	truly	present	within	such	
a	practice.	
9	The	importance	of	this	is	emphasised	by	Charles	Davis:	
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of	the	interaction	between	the	individual	and	Christ	isn’t	different	in	kind	from	the	
nature	 of	 interaction	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 have	 in	 prayer,	 worship,	 holy	
contemplation	or	any	other	activity	that	admits	of	the	possibility	of	experiencing	an	
intimate	encounter	with	Christ.	Thus,	the	Eucharist	isn’t	different	in	kind	from	any	
other	 form	 of	 sacramental	 (or	 otherwise)	 union.	 This	 invites	 the	 question:	 What	
makes	 the	 Eucharist	 special?10	 That	 is,	 if	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 is	
understood	derivatively	as	a	mode	of,	and	an	occasion	for,	second-person	experience	
of	Christ,	and	the	Christian	can	enjoy	shared-attention	and	second-person	experience	
of	Christ	through	the	reading	of	Scripture,	prayer	and	experiencing	Christian	art	(to	
name	 but	 a	 few	 examples),	 then	 there	 is	 nothing	 unique	 or	 distinctive	 about	 the	
Eucharistic	sacrament.	
	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 of	 what	 makes	 the	 Eucharist	 special,	 it	 will	 be	
important	 to	note	 that	 although	 the	 interaction	between	Christ	 and	 the	 individual	
isn’t	different	in	kind	from	other	interactions	with	Christ,	it	is	different	in	degree	and	
content,	and	understanding	this	difference	is	important	for	understanding	the	role	of	
the	elements	in	the	interaction	that	occurs.		
	 While	 the	 clear	 focus	 on	 Christ’s	 work	 on	 the	 cross	 provides	 a	 special	
opportunity	 to	 be	 sensitive	 to	 experiencing	 Christ	 in	 the	 aspects	we	have	 already	
discussed,	 it	doesn’t	 seem	 in	principle,	 that	 the	 same	content	of	 experience	of,	 for	
instance,	God-as-provider-of-redemption	could	not	also	be	gained	 through	earnest	
prayer	where	the	content	of	the	conversation	the	Christian	is	undertaking	with	God	
in	prayer	is	aimed	at	their	growing	to	understand	and	appreciate	this	aspect	of	their	
relationship	with	Christ.	However,	the	Eucharist	is	special,	and	unique	in	the	sense	
that	it	is	a	corporate	opportunity	of	focus	on	Christ	in	a	distinct	way,	and	one	that	is	
at	the	centre	of	Christian	being.	It	does	stand	out	as	an	opportunity	to	focus	on	the	
work	of	Christ	on	the	cross	more	than	in	any	other	regular	tradition	of	the	church.	But	
although	special	in	this	way,	the	content	of	the	experience,	and	the	possible	scope	of	
interaction	found	in	the	Eucharist,	isn’t	necessarily	unique	to	participation	in	it.	If	we	
were	to	imagine	a	person	who	for	some	pathological	reason	found	it	impossible	to	
engage	in	the	Eucharist	in	a	church	service,	we	can	still	imagine	them	to	have	both	the	
personal	and	corporate	aspects	of	experiencing	Christ	in	the	relevant	ways	through	
participation	 in	 a	 prayer	 retreat	 with	 a	 group.	 Space	 doesn’t	 permit	 us	 to	 give	
                                                
	
Catholic	piety	has	projected	upon	the	sacramental	presence	the	role	in	the	Christian	
life	that	properly	belongs	to	the	presence	of	Christ	by	grace	[…]	the	inward	and	
permanent	presence	by	grace,	to	which	the	Eucharist	itself	is	directed,	has	been	
forgotten.	[…]	The	Eucharist	is	the	expression	and	cause	of	our	personal	union	with	
Christ,	which	is	a	permanent	and	mutual	personal	presence.	It	is	a	personal	
encounter	with	Christ	in	which	he	once	again	offers	us	union	with	himself,	and	
invites	us	closer,	and	in	which	we	accept	and	draw	nearer	to	him.	(1968,	159)	
	
10	Or,	as	Martin	Luther	puts	this	problem,	‘If	Christ’s	body	is	everywhere,	ah,	then	I	shall	eat	and	drink	
him	in	all	the	taverns,	from	all	kinds	of	bowls,	glasses,	and	tankards!	Then,	there	is	no	difference	
between	my	table	and	the	Lord’s	table’	(1961,	67).	
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examples	for	each	and	every	aspect	of	the	Eucharist	we	have	discussed,	but	there	is	
no	reason	in	principle	to	think	that	matters	will	be	different	for	other	aspects,	though	
experiencing	Christ	in	some	way	may	well	be	more	straightforward	in	the	Eucharist	
than	elsewhere.11	So	Christ	commands	the	disciples	to	continue	with	the	practice	he	
institutes	because	it	is	good	for	them,	and	beneficial.12	But	not	because	it	is	necessary,	
and	without	it	there	would	be	some	aspect	of	union	with	Christ	that	they	would	be	
unable	to	enter	into.	
	 By	participating	in	the	Eucharist	we	experience	the	real	presence	of	Christ,	and	
this	 interaction	 is	 the	metaphysical	 core	 of	what	makes	 it	 the	 transformative	 and	
spiritually	nourishing	activity	that	it	is.	But	if	this	interaction	is	in	principle	possible	
without	the	elements,	how	do	the	elements	have	a	special	role	to	play	when	it	comes	
to	the	presence	of	Christ	being	available	to	us?	If	their	role	is	more	than	mnemonic,	
but	doesn’t	extend	as	far	as	being	substantially	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ,	as	we	
have	 already	 discussed,	 then	 what	 else	 is	 there.	 Well,	 like	 much	 human	 activity	
involving	interaction	there	is	an	element	of	communication—of	expression—to	the	
Eucharist.	Forms	of	liturgy,	and	more	informal	verbal	articulations	in	the	Eucharist,	
vary	widely.	But	the	core	central	element	to	the	tradition	are	the	receiving	of	bread	
and	wine	 along	with	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 their	 representative	 function	 as	 the	
body	of	Christ	and	the	blood	of	the	new	covenant	respectively.	The	elements	have	a	
powerful	 symbolic	 function	 that	 goes	 beyond	 corporate	 storytelling	 or	 provoking	
reflection.	 In	 receiving	 the	 elements	we	 accept	 Christ’s	 offer	 of	 himself	 through	 a	
tangible	physical	expression.	This	goes	beyond	our	acknowledging	that	we	have	in	
the	 past	 accepted	 Christ	 as	 saviour,	 and	 is	 a	 present	 act	 of	 reception	 that	 we	
communicate	to	God,	in	the	presence	of,	and	with,	our	spiritual	community,	through	
                                                
11	Note	that	if	we	had	argued	that	the	Eucharist	was	the	actual	offering	of	a	new	sacrifice,	then	this	
would	be	an	aspect	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	imagine	replicable	in	prayer.	
12	Especially	given	that	this	meal	provokes	the	participant	to	experience	Christ	in	a	complete	set	of	
aspects,	which	make	up	an	important	focal	point	in	our	regular	Christian	life	and	experience.	Luther	
makes	a	similar	response	to	this	question,	noting	that		
	
although	he	[Christ]	is	everywhere,	he	does	not	permit	himself	to	be	so	caught	and	
grasped;	he	can	easily	shell	himself,	so	that	you	get	the	shell	but	not	the	kernel.	Why?	
Because	it	is	one	thing	if	God	is	present,	and	another	if	he	is	present	for	you…since	
Christ’s	humanity	is	at	the	right	hand	of	God,	and	also	is	in	all	and	above	all	things	
according	to	the	nature	of	the	divine	right	hand,	you	will	not	eat	or	drink	him	like	the	
cabbage	and	soup	on	your	table,	unless	he	wills	it.	He	also	now	exceeds	any	grasp,	and	
you	will	not	catch	him	by	groping	about	even	though	he	is	in	your	bread,	unless	he	
binds	himself	 to	you	and	summons	you	 to	a	particular	 table	by	his	Words,	and	he	
himself	gives	meaning	to	the	bread	for	you,	by	his	Word,	bidding	you	to	eat	him.	This	
he	does	in	the	Supper,	saying	‘This	is	my	body’,	as	if	to	say	‘At	home	you	may	eat	bread	
also,	where	I	am	indeed	sufficiently	near	at	hand	too;	but	this	is	the	true	toutou,	the	
‘This	 is	 my	 body’:	 when	 you	 eat	 this,	 you	 eat	 my	 body,	 and	 nowhere	 else.	 Why?	
Because	I	wish	to	attach	myself	here	with	my	Word,	in	order	that	you	may	not	have	
to	buzz	about,	trying	to	seek	me	in	all	the	places	where	I	am;	this	would	be	too	much	
for	you,	and	you	would	also	be	too	puny	to	apprehend	me	in	these	places	without	the	
help	of	my	Word.	(1961,	69)	
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receiving	the	bread	and	wine.	Receiving	Christ,	and	entering	into	closer	union	with	
his	presence	is	an	action,	is	something	we	do—an	action.	It	is	an	action	involving	our	
relational	dispositions,	intentions	and	affections.	Like	all	interpersonal	actions,	they	
involve	 both	 parties,	 and	 become	 real	 through	 their	 manifestation.	 Without	
participation	 of	 both	 persons,	 they	 remain	 a	 subjective	 imagining	 within.	 Love,	
companionship,	comforting,	encouragement,	and	so	on	are	relational	because	 they	
find	 a	 cooperative	 manifestation	 that	 not	 only	 communicates	 the	 content	 of	 the	
relational	interaction,	but	also	is	that	interaction.	So	also	in	experiencing	the	offer	and	
reception	 of	 Christ,	 the	 receiving	 of	 the	 elements	 not	 only	 communicates	 our	
reception	of	Christ	and	his	work,	but	because	of	the	representative	meaning	vested	in	
the	elements	by	Jesus	at	the	Last	Supper,	it	is	the	act	we	perform	by	means	of	which	
we	instantiate	that	reception	in	a	relational	action.	
	
5.	Locating	the	real	presence	of	Christ	in	the	Eucharist	
	
	 Recognising	this	will	assist	us	in	thinking	about	where	we	place	the	presence	
of	 Christ.	 It	 isn’t	 strictly	 true	 to	 say	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 Christ	 is	 located	 in	 the	
elements—at	least	this	isn’t	true	at	face	value	as	matters	are	not	that	straightforward.	
The	 presence	 of	 Christ	 is	 located	 in	 the	 interaction	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	
communicant—the	 real	 presence	 of	 Christ	 is	 manifested	 and	 experienced	 in	 this	
interpersonal	 union.	 However,	 for	 the	 communicant,	 this	 relational	 interaction	 is	
manifested	by	 taking	 the	 elements.	 So,	 it	 isn’t	 a	mere	 gloss	 to	 claim	 that	 Christ	 is	
present	in	the	elements,	as	long	as	this	isn’t	taken	to	be	the	claim	that	Christ	is	present	
substantially	because	the	bread	and	wine	are	the	substances	Christ’s	body	and	blood.	
This	is	 just	not	the	aspect	of	Christ’s	real	presence	that	we	are	interested	in.13	The	
substantial	 presence	 of	 Christ	 was	 no	 guarantee	 of	 any	 interpersonal	 union,	 or	
meaningful	interaction,	for	those	in	the	first	century,	and	neither	is	it	for	us	today.	
	 The	presence	of	Christ	we	are	interested	in	involves	relationship.	The	aspect	
of	the	elements’	function	that	is	the	vehicle	for	this	relational	interaction	is	the	aspect	
under	which	it	is	then	true	to	say	that	Christ	is	present	in	the	elements.	Christ	isn’t	
present	substantially,	but	derivatively,	because	he	is	really	present	to	us	in	relational	
union	through	our	partaking	of	the	elements.	Notice	that	strictly	Christ	is	present	(to	
us)	in	our	taking	of	the	elements.	If	the	elements	were	to	lay	unused	after	the	service,	
or	indeed	to	be	eaten	by	a	church	mouse,	they	would	fail	to	be	aptly	described	as	the	
body	and	blood	of	Christ,	since	they	would	no	longer	be	involved	in	any	interpersonal	
interaction.	We	should	also	note	that	the	‘real	presence	of	Christ’	is	shorthand	for	a	
more	complex	manifestation	of	Christ’s	real	presence	that	falls	under	his	presenting	
himself	in	the	ways	pertinent	to	these	symbols—his	offering	his	body	and	blood,	and	
                                                
13	Note	that	the	metaphysical	puzzles	of	multi-location,	and	of	essences	and	accidents,	associated	
with	transubstantiation,	just	don’t	arise	in	this	view—in	this	sense,	it	is	as	metaphysically	
undemanding	as	the	memorialist	view.	At	all	times	the	elements	remain	substantially	bread	and	
wine.	
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all	that	that	means	to	us	as	we	interact	with	this	(which	we	have	discussed	at	length	
above).	So	to	be	more	precise,	though	also	more	laborious,	Christ	is	‘bodily’	present	
in	terms	of	being	present	in	a	way	that	allows	us	to	interact	with	the	offering	of	his	
real	 body	 and	 all	 that	 this	means	 to	 us,	 and	 his	 ‘blood’	 is	 present	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
significance	and	reality	of	the	union	and	covenant	bound	in	his	blood	being	actually	
experienced	by	us	through	our	taking	ourselves	to	be	representatively	partaking	of	
his	real	blood.	
	 As	 Charles	 Davis	 (1968)	 suggests,	 in	 a	 transignificationist	 view	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	 it	 is	 correct	 to	 say	 that	 the	 elements	 are	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ	
because	what	something	 is,	 considered	 in	 terms	of	what	role	 it	plays	 for	us	as	we	
interact	with	it,	is	a	matter	of	how	we	treat	that	thing.	Thus,	the	referring	terms	we	
use	 to	 denote	 objects	 are	 correctly	 applied	 by	 analysing	 whether	 those	 objects	
function	 in	 a	 way	 that	 meets	 the	 criteria	 of	 those	 terms	 considered	 as	 a	 human	
category	of	thought	by	which	we	delineate	the	type	of	things	objects	are.	However,	
there	are	many	ways	in	which	it	may	be	true	to	say	that	the	elements	‘are’	the	body	
and	blood	of	Christ	in	this	sense—because	of	the	way	in	which	we	treat	them,	without	
it	being	true	that	they	are	the	vehicle,	or	manifestation,	of	the	sort	of	interpersonal	
interaction	we	have	delineated.	The	concern	here	is	that	it	may	be	subjectively	true	
that	we	treat	the	elements	in	a	certain	way,	that	makes	the	use	of	some	terminology	
appropriate	under	our	own	usage,	but	that	there	should	be	some	further	objective	
basis	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 state	 of	 affairs	 obtaining	 –	 Christ	 is	 really	 present,	 that	
doesn’t	depend	on	our	usage	of	terminology	or	on	human	categories	of	thought.	The	
transignification	view	doesn’t	go	far	enough	in	telling	us	what	sort	of	treatment	of	the	
objects	is	at	work	in	making	it	true	that	they	are,	to	us,	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ.14	
Once	we	do	go	further	and	spell	out	how	we	are	treating	the	elements,	and	the	role	
that	they	are	playing	in	the	experience	of,	and	interaction	with	the	person	of	Christ,	
we	end	up	with	the	view	we	have	outlined	above.	But	by	now,	we	do	not	need	to	claim	
that	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	 elements	 are	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ	 in	 Davis’	
transignificationist	sense.	We	arrive	at	an	objective	basis	for	the	question	of	whether	
Christ	is	really	present	that	depends	solely	on	whether	the	state	of	affairs	–	Christ’s	
being	present	(in	the	discussed	sense),	actually	obtains.		
	 It	will	be	informative	to	quickly	consider	how	this	view	compares	to	two	test	
questions	proposed	by	Michael	Dummett	 (1987)	as	a	 test	of	 the	acceptability	of	 a	
theory	 of	 presence	 in	 the	 Eucharist.15	 Dummett	 suggests	 that	 the	 answer	 to	 the	
question	 of	whether	 the	 elements	 are	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ	 should	 be	 an	
unqualified	‘yes’.	Furthermore,	the	ability	to	provide	this	answer	should	depend	on	a	
genuine	belief	 in	 the	 incarnation.	By	unqualified	Dummett	 seems	 to	have	 in	mind	
ruling	out	the	sorts	of	qualifications	that	could	be	offered	by	memorialists,	whereby	
we	say	yes	in	virtue	of	Christ	being	present	anyway,	and	our	being	provoked	to	relate	
to	Christ	through	the	symbolic	meaning	of	the	elements	alone	(since	Dummett	goes	
                                                
14	Other	objections	have	also	been	raised,	and	the	view	also	rests	on	a	questionable	view	of	how	
terms	of	reference	relate	to	the	nature	of	objects.	
15	This	isn’t	necessarily	to	endorse	Dummett’s	criteria	as	necessary,	or	even	sufficient.	
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on	to	offer	some	qualification	in	exposition	of	his	own	view).	As	the	discussion	in	the	
last	 two	 paragraphs	 should	 have	 made	 clear,	 it	 is	 correct	 for	 us	 to	 say	 that	 the	
elements	are	the	body	and	blood,	and	that	the	real	presence	of	Christ	is	manifest	in	
the	 Eucharist.	 But	 notice	 that	 it	 is	 also	 true	 that	 without	 genuine	 belief	 in	 the	
incarnation	it	is	impossible	to	truly	claim	that	the	Eucharist	contains	the	real	presence	
of	Christ.	Without	belief	in	the	incarnation,	it	would	be	impossible	to	relate	to	Christ	
and	his	work	through	interaction	with	his	presenting	himself	to	us	under	the	body	
and	blood.	If	Christ	has	not	become	incarnate,	then	the	proffered	relationship	is	just	
not	one	that	exists	except	in	the	imagination.	So,	without	the	interaction	taking	place,	
it	is	true	to	say	that	there	is	no	real	presence,	and	only	the	presence	of	bread	and	wine.	
So	Dummett’s	criteria	are	satisfied,	this	view	affirms	that	the	real	presence	of	Christ	
is	in	the	Eucharistic	meal	(as	an	event)	due	to	the	interpersonal	interaction	that	takes	
place	through	participation	in	it.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
	 Having	discussed	the	different	ways	in	which	we	can	understand	the	claim	that	
Christ	 is	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 an	 account	 of	 Christ’s	
fundamental	location	in	the	elements	faces	difficulties.	In	contrast	to	a	fundamental	
understanding	 of	 Christ’s	 presence,	 we	 have	 argued	 for	 a	 derivative	 account	 of	
Christ’s	being	present	to	the	individual	in	which	the	elements	serve	as	mode	of,	and	
an	 occasion,	 for	 a	 second-personal,	 shared-attention	 experience	 with	 Christ.	 This	
receptionist	view	describes	the	Eucharist	as	a	sacrament	 in	which	the	participants	
engage	with	and	interact	with	Christ	as	a	living	person.	And	thus,	as	well	as	avoiding	
the	metaphysical	 difficulties	 associated	with	 fundamental	 accounts,	 a	 receptionist	
account	 of	 the	 Eucharist	 has	 a	 much	 greater	 potential	 for	 explaining	 the	
transformative	power	of	the	sacrament	in	the	spiritual	life	of	the	participants.	As	we	
have	seen,	this	position	can	still	make	sense	of	the	claim	that	Christ	is	present	in	the	
Eucharist,	and	we	are	also	able	to	explain	the	uniqueness	of	this	sacrament,	compared	
with	other	experiences	of	Christ’s	presence.	Thus,	 the	position	we	have	developed	
here	is	both	philosophically	robust	as	well	as	being	able	to	account	for	the	centrality	
and	importance	of	this	practice	in	lives	of	Christian	believers.		
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